Rationalization in Weber and Habermas: A Comparative Perspective on a Macrosociological Concept

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This paper overviews the macrosociology of Weber and Habermas by focusing on the ways they conceptualized rationalization. The first section of the paper discusses Weber’s classification for different types of rationality and emphasizes Weber’s criticism of formal rationality. This section outlines how Weber described the Janus-faced character of rationalization, which does bring systematization to society, and may result in the obliteration of the human dimension within systematic concerns. The second section of the paper focuses on Habermas’s reinterpretation of the notion of rationalization. It includes the rationalization and scientization of politics, the rationalization-colonization distinction of the lifeworld, and the rationalization of politics as deliberation process and law. The paper argues that the double character of rationalization can be referred to as the dialectic of rationalization.

KEYWORDS Rationalization, Weber, Habermas, types of rationality, bureaucratization, scientization of politics, colonization of the lifeworld, macrosociology

The position of macrosociology within the discipline of sociology is ambivalent. According to one view, the discipline has always been inclined towards the analysis of the macro, and hence the macro needs to be seen as a general characteristic of the field. For Peter Knapp, the classical theories of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber were cases of historical macrotheory, focusing on the transition from feudal/traditional to capitalist / industrial / modern society. The works of these founding fathers were about large-scale process, both in terms of the numbers of individuals and the length of time involved. Knapp stresses...
that most modern sociology deals with small-scale structures, assumed to function within a social context that is treated as given, for the purpose of the analysis, as a result of a macro-micro split, created by modern American sociology.1 The sociologist Mohamed Cherkaoui disagrees with this view equating macrosociology to sociology, and argues that the role of sociological theories is also to explain a series of individual behavior, such as voting behavior, household consumption, and all sorts of choices of individuals.2 Therefore, for Cherkaoui, the crucial question involves the different ways of integrating the micro and the macro.

If macrosociology is not equivalent to sociology, it is a subdiscipline of the field, which raises the question of defining its limits. The historical sociologist Charles Tilly sees in the work of Marx, Weber and other pioneers of the discipline rich and ambitious historical and comparative examinations of power, freedom and human agency, and thus accepts their contribution within the scope of macrosociology. However, one might have the impression that when Tilly refers to macrosociology, what he has in mind is something much narrower, big case comparison of social experiences, such as contention, revolution or labor relations.3 The big case comparison à la Tilly is an endeavor solidly history based rather than theory oriented.

It seems that there is a certain consensus that sociology as a discipline was established by studying macro theories of the effects of division of labor, the consequences of rationalization, secularization, and growth of bureaucratic structures. There have been several references made to a revival of macrosociology. However, there appears to be little consensus about where to locate this revival, either in terms of time or methodology. For Frank Elwell, the sociology of Norbert Elias is an example of macrosociology.4 For Tilly, the revival of macrosociology corresponds to the works of S. N. Eisenstadt, Barrington More and others from the late 1950s onwards. In his book Macrosociology: Four Modern Theorists, Elwell assesses C. Wright Mills’s and Immanuel Wallerstein’s sociologies as examples of macrosociology.5 A more recent perspective is the position of Bruce Western

and Christopher Muller, who take the work of Loïc Wacquant on “hyper-incarceration,”
criminalization of poverty and new forms of racial domination as a contribution to
macrosociology.6

Ambiguity persists with respect to the scope and definition of macrosociology. Stephen Sanderson states that macrosociology devotes itself to the study of large-scale social patterns. The focus of macrosociology is total societies and their major elements, including the economy, the political system, the mode of family life, and the nature of religious system. According to Sanderson, another concern for macrosociology is world networks of interacting societies.7 Amos Hawley uses macrosociology as a specific unit of analysis.8 This is the study of organizations and networks of organizations, including all their forms, ranging from the simplest to the most complex, as opposed to psychological properties of individuals. For Cherkaoui, what distinguishes macrosociology from other types of sociological investigations is that it does not start the research process by making hypotheses about individual behavior. Cherkaoui sees macrosociology as the study of social phenomena covering wide areas over long periods of time, with theories and concepts operating on a systemic level and using aggregated data.9

As sociology established itself as an academic discipline studying modern society, large-scale patterns have been objects of sociological inquiry since the early days of the discipline. Negative consequences of modernity, including different types of anomie or poverty, are examples for this large-scale patterns. Another central social pattern, which has been a key characteristic of modernity, is bureaucratization. This includes institutionalization and over-arching regulation of different aspects of social life, production and state-citizen relations. The most notable consequence of bureaucratization is rationalization—referring, mainly, to the functioning of institutions in a depersonalized manner. This implies a certain degree of improvement of human society. Yet, at the same time, it brings a series of unprecedented risks due to irrational consequences of rationalization, which are coupled with standardization and over-bureaucratization.

Drawing on all these discussions, this paper seeks to provide an overview of the macrosociology of Weber and Jürgen Habermas by focusing on the ways they conceptualized

rationalization. In this sense, it is a return to the old concern of macro theories, which deals with the growth of rational-legal bureaucratic structures. This overview will provide a framework of continuity within German social theory, as long as it shows how Habermas builds his understanding of rationalization within the Weberian tradition. It looks at rationalization as it is suggested by Weber, a founding father of the discipline, and at rationalization as it is furthered by Habermas, a contemporary social theorist, from a comparative perspective. In this sense, the paper sheds light on the new meanings of the concept of rationalization, and in doing so it reads the revival of macrosociology through Habermas’s use of rationalization. Put differently, the paper emphasizes the relevance of Habermas, a figure often neglected in the macrosociology debates. By establishing its boundaries as such, this paper posits that the way to do macrosociology is through theory and not historical analysis. It accepts that as a discipline, sociology lends itself to macro-level analyses. Nevertheless, to emphasize diversity within the field of sociology, macrosociology needs to be taken as a subdiscipline, rather than as being equivalent to the overall field.

What is the justification for a comparative analysis on the concept of rationalization as used by Weber and Habermas? The comparison is justified by the theoretical proximity of Weber and Habermas. One can draw a line of continuity from Weber to Habermas within the framework of German social theory and the way it problematized modernity. In this proximity, the role of the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers is crucial. When Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer published *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in German in 1944, the central theme of the book was the self-destruction of Enlightenment and destructive aspects of progress.10 This theme was a Weberian framework inherited by the members of the Frankfurt School. David Held argues that the concept of rationalization has a crucial function in this sense. The analysis of the spread of rationalization by the members of the Frankfurt School adhered to a number of Weber’s major tenets. This analysis mostly focused on the extension of instrumental reason, or means-end rationality. The early generation of the Institute of Social Research took “irrationality of the rationalization” seriously.11 Habermas, a member of the second generation Frankfurt School, continued to pursue the same problematic. This link makes it possible to observe a continuity from Weber to Habermas around the concept of rationalization, and the comparison

attempted in this article furthers our understanding of different uses of the concept over time.

Moreover, a close reading of the concept of rationalization reveals the proximity of Weber’s approach to a certain way reading Marx’s sociology, which reinforces the aforementioned justification. In the sociology of the post-World War II period, Weber was mostly presented as a comprehensive critique of Marx, and the points on which they disagreed were indicated as absolute divergence. But in the last three decades, several sociologists have considered them as two sociologists dealing with different facets of the same problematic, and see them as complementary. The advocates of this view accuse Talcott Parson, in particular, of presenting Weber as an absolute critique of Marx in his search for his own anti-Marxism. They also argue that Parsons carelessly translated Weber into English, and this incompetent translation fortified the impression of absolute divergence.

This perspective takes the additional step of assuming some overlapping or intersection between Marx and Weber. In addition, the notion of rationalization has a special position in the assumption of a German continuity between Marx and Weber. Accordingly, either Marx’s alienation is seen as a contribution predating Weber’s rationalization or Weber’s rationalization is considered as a reinterpretation of Marx’s alienation. Both Marx and Weber see free labor as a necessary condition of capitalism. This process corresponds to alienation in Marxist thought and rationalization in Weberian social theory. Hence, it is possible to consider alienation and rationalization as coinciding. In this new interpretation Löwith has a special role:


14. Michel Löwy says that Weber does not argue one-way causality between Protestantism and capitalism but rather he uses the term Wahlverwandtschaft, a term of alchemy that means a reciprocal influence and attraction. According to Löwy, Talcott Parsons was unable to provide the full meaning of Wahlverwandtschaft, so many English readers could not understand this nuance regarding reciprocality. Indeed, Weber also acknowledged economic factors for the explanation of the origin of capitalism; see Michel Löwy, On Changing the World.
“It was Löwith who emphasized the importance of comparing rationalization in Weber with alienation in Marx. Because rationalization involves the separation of the individual from the control over the means of knowledge and production, we can argue that Marx’s alienation in some respects is merely a subtype of this general rationalization process. Löwith saw that in Weber rationalization was a liberal critique of capitalism that had transformed society into an iron cage, just as the alienation theme in Marx was a moral condemnation of the labor process in capitalist production.”15

This paper starts by discussing how Weber developed the concept of rationalization. The first section elaborates Weber’s classification for different types of rationality. It also deals with Weber’s criticism of formal rationality. The second section focuses on Habermas’s reinterpretation of the notion of rationalization. It will consist of these three points: the rationalization and scientization of politics, the rationalization-colonization distinction of the lifeworld, and the rationalization of politics as deliberation process and law. Examining what Habermas meant by rationalization in different periods will be helpful in trying to comprehend his perspective, which does not attribute only negative connotations to the process of rationalization.

1. THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALIZATION IN WEBER: THE IRON CAGE AND BEYOND

One of Weber’s main objectives in his sociological work was to comprehend the process of modernity at a macro level. In his effort to understand modernity, two key notions have special importance: rationalization and bureaucratization. It seems fair to judge rationalization, which lies at the heart of Weber’s substantive sociology, as his most significant contribution. Yet his gigantic work does not offer a clear definition of rationalization. In his piece entitled “Basic Sociological Terms”16, he does not reserve a specific subsection for the term, and defines it rather vaguely. He states that “one of the most important aspects of the process of ‘rationalization’ of action is the substitution of the unthinking acceptance of ancient customs, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest.”17 Moreover, he informs readers that he will deal with this concept in his work on the sociology of religion. Although this definitional sentence offers some insight into rationalization, it is far from providing the total picture. For that reason, what should be done is to discuss first what Weber meant by the term rationality.

1.1 Types of Rationality

Some sociologists argue that Weber wrote about only “objectified” rationality, where actions are in accord with some process of external systematization. This “objective” rationality is seen as divisible into four groups. The first is practical rationality. This is essentially every way of life that views and judges worldly activities in relation to the individual’s purely pragmatic and egoistic interests. The second is theoretical rationality, which is a cognitive effort to master reality not through action but rather through complex abstract concepts. Certain religious or philosophic reflections and scientific activities are examples of theoretical rationality. The third is substantive rationality, which refers to a choice of means to specific ends within the context of a system of values. Weber does not limit these three types of rationalities to the modern Western world but rather argues that they are observable trans-civilizationally and trans-historically. The fourth type is formal rationality. This is basically means-ends calculation. What makes it different from other forms of rationalities is that in the first three forms, calculation is based on personal interest while in formal rationality, there is a reference to universally applied rules, laws, and regulations. Another difference between the first three forms of rationality and formal rationality is that where the first three were observable in any geography of the world, formal rationality is peculiar to the West and it is conceived by Weber to be the result of industrialization. The universally applied rules, laws, and regulations that characterize formal rationality in the West are found particularly in the economic, legal, and scientific institutions, as well as in the bureaucratic form of domination. In effect, Weber opens his well-known book *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* by emphasizing that formal rationality is unique to Western civilization. He states:

“A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.”

For Weber, the distinctiveness of Western civilization is related to formal rationality. The systemic philosophy of the West and positive law (the modern legal system) are

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examples of formal rationality and are genuinely western in their characteristics. Formal rationality has a key role in understanding modernity in general and Weber’s concept of rationalization in particular. Therefore, it is important to clarify its characteristics. George Ritzer delineates six basic characteristics of formal rationality: first, it has calculability.20 Second, it focuses on efficiency; it has the ability to find the best means to an end. Third, in a formal rational system, everything should be predictable; operations should be homogenous in different times and locations. Fourth, human technology (or human labor) should be replaced by nonhuman technology, such as computerized systems. Fifth, there should be constantly increasing control over an array of uncertainties. The sixth characteristic, which is the most crucial to understanding why Weber is partially critical of rationality, is rational systems tend to have a series of irrational consequences for people that have a contact with the system. From Weber’s point of view, one of the irrationalities of rationality is that the world tends to become less enchanted, less magical and ultimately less meaningful to people. This is the disenchantment of the world by formal rationality.

1.2 FROM FORMAL RATIONALITY TO RATIONALIZATION

These six characteristics of formal rationality, or the disenchantment of the world, provide a considerable bridge to the Weberian notion of rationalization. As Giddens indicates, rationalization encompasses a range of elements of modern life.21 One of its positive aspects is the intellectualization it brings; on the other hand, it implies the disenchantment of the world, which is negative. Moreover, rationalization covers the growth of rationality in the sense that the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by the use of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means. Giddens adds that rationalization covers the growth of rationality in the sense of the formation of ethics that are systematically oriented to fixed goals.

At this point, it is necessary to note that although Weber perceives formal rationality as something peculiar to the West, he understands rationalization as a much larger phenomenon observed in different geographies. According to Weber, the rationalization of different spheres, such as the “rationalization of mystical contemplation” and the “rationalization of economic life,” can be observed in different areas of the world:

“… each one of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another. Hence, rationalization of the most varied character has existed in various departments of life and in all civilizations.”

In his text “Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions,” Weber (2002b) states that the order of the world is shaped increasingly by the rationalization process, and that this leads to a permanent tension between world order and traditional social values. In other words, Weber observes a continuous tension between religion and rationalization. The tension is valid for nine different spheres, but it assumes the most acute form in the political and intellectual spheres. When the political realm is taken into consideration, the tension is between politics, which is rational and national to various degrees, and religion. First, the tension appears between the universalist character of religion and the local or tribal basis of politics, due to the importance of brotherliness to religion. As the rationalization of politics intensifies, the tension becomes clearer. In the patriarchal orders of the past, most of the state’s operations were actualized within a framework of “regard to person.” However, rationalization gave rise to “political man,” not unlike what the “economic man” it produced. This imparts anonymity to people in their transactions, such that they are carried out “without regard to the person.” This is the end of the “personal obligation of piety” and the beginning of the reinforcement of “reason of state,” which aims only at safeguarding the state’s power. Weber observes the tension in its sharpest form in the intellectual sphere because the tension is not only between the religious realm and worldly rationalization; there is also a tendency towards rationalization within the religious realm. The more religion became book-religion and had a systematized doctrine, the less space was reserved for priestly control. The tension within the religious realm had an effect on the educational system, too. The priesthood’s monopoly over education could not survive after the rationalization of the world.

At this point, it can be also argued that in Weberian terms, the modern state an institutionalized version of rationalization. Bryan S. Turner points out that this formulation is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who criticized the state for being an institution of mediocrity.

On that account, Weber was critical of full rationalization. Ritzer explains that Weber’s apprehension was due to the fact that formal rationalization was becoming dominant over other types of rationalities. For Weber, this was true especially in the West, where practitioners of formal rationality, like the bureaucrats or the capitalist, were becoming much too powerful. Accordingly, this could be interpreted as a threat to the autonomous and free individual, which in the Weberian perspective is Western civilization’s highest ideal. But this does not mean that for Weber rationalization was at all negative. On the contrary, especially in the field of law, he advocates a high degree of rationalization. This point requires further elaboration.

Habermas states that Weber regarded the political systems of modern Western societies as forms of “legal domination.”25 Their legitimacy is based upon a belief in the legality of their exercise of political power. In this framework, Weber supported a positivistic concept of law: law is precisely what the political legislator - whether democratic or not - enacts as law in accordance with a legally institutionalized procedure. According to this perspective, law cannot draw its legitimating force from an alliance between law and morality. In the view of Weber, law possesses its own rationality, independent of morality. He believes that any fusion of law and morality threatens the rationality of law and thus the basis of the legitimacy of legal domination. Weber diagnosed such a fatal moralization of law in contemporary developments, which he describes as the “materialization” of bourgeois formal law. Habermas comments that by “materialization” of civil law, Weber forecasted the rise of the welfare state and rejected the protective function that went along with it. Undoubtedly, this is related to Weber’s dismissal of the guaranteed rights of workers.26 As a result, Weber was aware of both some of the dangers and benefits of rationalization.

The true nature of this problem of rationalization might better be understood within a specific subset of it: bureaucratization. The advantage of examining this phenomenon is that Weber spent more time on it and developed a more systematic approach towards it. What’s more, the significance of bureaucratization is more apparent when the state is concerned. Weber argues that bureaucracy is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and, in the private economy only in the most

advanced institutions of capitalism. He was appalled by the effects of bureaucratization, and more generally, of the rationalization of the world of which bureaucratization is one component. But he seems certainly to have accepted that this is the only possible course. He describes bureaucracies as “escape proof,” “practically unshatterable,” and as the hardest institutions to destroy once they are established. In his account, individual bureaucrats could not “squirm out” of the bureaucracy once they were harnessed in it. Weber concluded that the future belongs to bureaucratization, and as time passed, his prediction became more and more valid.

According to Weber, bureaucracy has six characteristics. First, a bureaucracy is based on the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, i.e., by laws or administrative regulations. Second, it involves the principles of office hierarchy and levels of graded authority. This means a firmly ordered system of superiority and subordination in which there is a surveillance of the lower offices by the higher ones. Third, related to Weber’s emphasis on the rise of the spirit of capitalism, is the culture of written archives. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (the files), which are preserved in their original or copied form. Fourth, bureaucracy depends on office management: at the very least, all specialized office management presupposes complete and expert training. Fifth, when the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in bureau may be strictly limited. The sixth characteristic of bureaucracy is that the management of the office is expected to follow general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and which can be learned.27

These six characteristics are also descriptive of the peculiarities of the modern state. Moreover, in Weber’s perspective, bureaucracy is the basic instrument through which power relation(s) generated by state can be grasped. In his words, bureaucracy is the means of carrying “community action” over into rationally ordered “societal action.” Therefore, as an instrument for “societalizing” relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order, for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus. Weber underlines that rationally structured “societal action,” namely bureaucracy, is superior to every resistance of “mass” or even of “communal action.” This is why when the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried out a type of power relation is established that is particularly unbreakable. This is

the permanent character of the bureaucratic machine, and in effect, the basic distinctiveness of the modern state.28

Weber was in a quandary when it came to bureaucracy; while he acknowledged the positive aspects of rationalization and the inevitability of bureaucratization, he was also rather critical of the process. His criticism of bureaucratization is most notable in his discussion of bureaucracy having a position of power because of the secret information it wielded. In Weber’s understanding, every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of secret sessions. This is how it tries to shield knowledge and action from criticism. Weber concedes that this may be acceptable in specific fields of administration, as in the case of military or diplomatic bureaucracy. The concept of the “official secret” is the specific invention of bureaucracy, which fanatically defends its existence. However, Weber believes that it has limited justification. Bureaucracy even struggles to conceal information vis-à-vis parliaments. Weber maintains that bureaucracy welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament, at least in so far as ignorance is in the interest of the bureaucracy. Therefore, Weber concluded that there was an entrenched dichotomy between democracy and bureaucracy.

In Weber’s framework, the tension between democracy and bureaucracy is not limited to an information fight (word originally used by Weber) between bureaucrats and parliament. The problem is much more substantial. The extension of democratic rights demanded “bureaucratic centralization,” to control the vitality of those rights, but the problem is that the reverse did not follow. Centralization did not lead to further democratization; on the contrary, it had the effect of limiting the usage of rights. Centralization also resulted in the bureaucratization of the democratic process, through which a substantial part of the population was transformed into passive observers subject to administrative decisions. Weber sees the voting mechanism as being insufficient to surmount this passivity.

2. THE NOTION OF RATIONALIZATION IN HABERMAS: OPTIMISM CUOPLED WITH CRITICISM

Three distinct groups of Habermas’s works need to be emphasized when examining his account of the notion of rationalization. Accordingly, this section will first focus on

his evaluation on technology and science, and his perspective on scientization of politics. This is followed by a look at his perspective in his book *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Finally, what he understands by the rationalization of law will be discussed. Generally, it seems fair to argue that in these three distinct discussions on rationalization, Habermas remains critical of a certain type of rationalization in the context of the political public sphere, the communicative realm or the domain of law, albeit each time offering a suggestion as to the correct version of rationalization for each of the three realms. Therefore, despite his critique of rationalization in different dimensions, he never abandons the possibility of an enabling rationalization.

2.1 RATIONALIZATION AND SCIENTIZATION OF POLITICS

Although Habermas’s position is much more optimistic about the opportunities offered by technical progress, (in contrast to other figures of the Frankfurt School) and he thinks that the problem with technological modernization has little to do with technology itself, he still has a series of concern with respect to scientization of politics. In his meditation on technology, he follows the first generation of the Frankfurt School, including Marcuse, in employing a critical dialogue that he developed with Weber’s notion of “rationalization” coupled with Lukács’s reification. At a later stage, he introduces the concept of colonization of lifeworld, a negative end result of monetarization and bureaucratization of everyday practices. His concerns regarding scientization of politics need to be taken into consideration as a systemic treatment of the effects of science on everyday life and a preparatory step towards his later conceptualization.

32. Reification is the notion derived by Lukács from Marx’s treatment of the subordination of man to the machine and human effacement by their labor, which shows how man’s own activity, or labor, becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to man; see Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1975), pp.83-110. The concept of reification is useful in understanding Habermas’s argument on science and technology.
In his article “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology,’” Habermas first develops his distinction between system integration and social integration; later on, this distinction will form the basis for his analysis of the lifeworld. In this article, Habermas searches for the right terminology: he uses the term “work” to mean system integration, and “interaction” to refer to social integration. By “work,” which is almost equivalent to “purposive-rational action,” he understands either instrumental action or rational choice or their incorporation. Technical rules, strategies based on analytic knowledge, and defined goals under given conditions are the basic characteristics of “work,” or system integration.

What he understands by “integration” or social integration is basically communicative action and a medium of interaction working with social symbols. Social integration is governed by binding consensual norms. These norms define reciprocal expectations about the behavior of social actors, and they are enforced through sanctions. Habermas observes fundamental distinctions between system integration and social integration in three respects: a) level of definitions, b) mechanism of acquisition, and c) “rationalization”.

System integration defines itself in a context-free language. Technical rules are designed in order to function in all different environments. But social integration is defined through intersubjectively shared ordinary language. While they are in the sphere of system integration, social actors acquire their position within the system by learning skills and qualifications. While they are in the sphere of social integration, they appropriate their positions by role internalization. For Habermas, the fundamental distinction is also observable in terms of how they define “rationalization,” i.e., the success of integration. For system integration, success means the growth of productive forces and the extension of technical control. But for social integration “rationalization” or achievement corresponds to emancipation. According to Habermas, as long as the level of social integration increases, there will be more individuation, extension of communication, and less domination. This is the first point where Habermas identifies two types of rationalization and as he rejects the idea of “value neutrality” in social sciences, he is clearly in favor of rationalization of social integration.

In the 1960s, Habermas observes a technocratic social setting, where “purposive-rational” or “instrumental and strategic” ideological framework is dominant. As in this setting, common problems of society are not discussed in the public sphere but rather solved through a technical process, practical questions are excluded from publicness, and it is no longer possible to talk about the political function of the public sphere. This technocratic social setting corresponds to the self-reification of man. The priority of the

new system is no longer social integration, composed of the intersubjectivity of ordinary language, reciprocal expectations about behavior, social norms or even emancipatory potentials, but rather system integration/maintenance. With system maintenance, the private form of capital utilization and a political form of distributung social rewards that provides mass loyalty appear as the main concerns. An excellent example, one which best explains the passage from social integration to system integration, is the space of ethics in these two different social settings. Ethics, a significant life category for social integration, is repressed by technocratic consciousness. The positivist way of thinking and perceiving all world events renders dead categories like ethics, which remain powerless in the face of technical control. In this way, there are even fewer subjects remaining available for public discussion. This is an important reason for the diminishing political realm. The depolitization of the masses is the human’s self-objectification and technocratic consciousness is indeed legitimizing such minimization of the public sphere.

What Habermas suggests as an alternative to technocratic mentality and practice is the “pragmatistic model,” which appeared in his article “The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion.” Here, Habermas states that when it comes to the scientization of politics, neither the decisionistic model nor the technocratic model, or even an expanded decisionistic model, bring it about. The decisionistic model emphasizes the necessity of decisions that must remain basically beyond public discussion. Its theoretical framework reduces the process of democratic decision-making to a regulated acclamation procedure of elites alternately appointed to exercise power. However, Habermas also talks about the replacement of the decisionistic model by the technocratic one. The technocratic model assumes a reduction of political power to rational administration at the expense of democracy. Objective necessities become the main criteria for politicians, and in such an environment there is no need for a functioning public, other than to legitimize the administrative personnel, at best. Inherent in this model is the positivistic separation of theory and practice. Returning to the theory-praxis problem once again, this separation is crucial for the decline of publicness. Habermas states:

“The depolitization of the mass of the population and the decline of the public realm as a political institution are components of a system of domination that tends to exclude practical questions from public discussion. The bureaucratized exercise of power has its counterpart in a public realm confined to spectacles and acclamation. This takes care of the approval of the mediatized population.”

Habermas believes that a better process of scientization of politics can be achieved by replacing this inaccurate association of technology and politics with ideal conditions of general communication extended to the entire public free from domination.37 In his words, in the last analysis, the – desirable – process of bridging science and politics is (or ought to be) related to public opinion. Therefore, the pragmatist model emphasizes human interaction in every aspect of life, as well as politics. The basis of the pragmatist model is the replacement of the strict separation between the function of the expert and the politician with a relationship based on critical interaction.38 Habermas sees reciprocal communication as both possible and necessary; through it, scientific experts advise decision-makers and politicians consult scientists in accordance with practical needs. Hence, the model does not object to the idea of rationalization; on the contrary, by aiming to build an adequate relationship between science/technology and politics, a correct scientization of politics is presumed.39 The pragmatist model is necessarily related to democracy. Furthermore, this relationship is built upon a model that does not depend on technical rules or objectified goals for system maintenance, which are the key elements of other models. In contrast, the pragmatistic model is based on a consciousness that can only be enlightened hermeneutically.40 This shows the emphasis Habermas places on human interaction, unbounded by formal purposive rationality. Instead, the model’s priority is on the articulation in the discussion (discourse) of the citizens in a community, without the predefined hegemony of experts. The main focus of such discussions should be the direction of technical progress, which will be achieved on the basis of practical needs. Accordingly, the emphasis is removed from the independence of technology and placed on practical needs, discussed hermeneutically. It is through such a discussion environment that the relationship between the sciences and public opinion can be constructed, and this will also be constitutive for the scientization of politics. For Habermas, such a perspective would constitute a counter-tendency to the decline of publicness, and it would revitalize the inert public sphere.

2.2 RATIONALIZATION VERSUS COLONIZATION OF THE LIFEWORLD

The major contribution of The Theory of Communicative Action is as an analysis of the types of social actions. In this book, Habermas first discusses teleological/strategic

action, normatively regulated action, and dramaturgical action, and then contributes his own concept of communicative action.41

Habermas does not propose the supremacy of communicative action over other types of social actions. What he proposes is a more balanced employment of different types of social actions in different contexts. In this sense, he seems quite Weberian. As Kalberg notes, in Weber’s sociology there are four types of rationality, namely practical rationality, theoretical rationality, substantive rationality, and lastly, formal rationality.42 Weber is best known for his criticism of formal rationality, but indeed he was critical about the overuse of formal rationality. And what was proposed by Weber was using the appropriate type of rationality, in the appropriate context. This is the idea followed by Habermas. Accordingly, in some contexts, Habermas believes that a more regulative type of social action could be necessary.

Having already described his fourfold concept of social action, in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas offers much more systematic explanations about—his old theme—the dichotomy between system integration and social integration. As in Legitimation Crisis, where he refers to the milieu of social integration as “lifeworld,” which is symbolically structured;43 in The Theory of Communicative Action he rarely uses the term social integration, and refers mostly to the lifeworld. In the first volume, he offers a definition of the lifeworld. He conceptualizes lifeworld as being parallel to the background consensus developed in “What is Universal Pragmatics?”44

He introduces the concept of the Lebenswelt or lifeworld as the correlate of the process of reaching understanding. Lifeworld is the general or common horizon, where subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding. The lifeworld is formed by background convictions. In his own words, “this lifeworld background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic.”45

42. Stephen Kalberg, “Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Process in History.”
44. Habermas clarifies background consensus in three articles: a) an implicit knowledge of pre-declared validity claims by both speaker and hearer; b) a common supposition on satisfaction of the presupposition of communication; and c) any validity claims are either already clear or can be made clear. The reason for the last article is that the sentences, propositions, expressed intentions, and utterances should satisfy corresponding adequacy conditions; see Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p.6. Only in the case where these three articles are fulfilled together will there be a communication in the sense of action oriented to reaching a common understanding.
Moreover, he attributes to lifeworld a function that tradition has: he notes that the lifeworld also stores the interpretative work of the preceding generations.

2.2.1 RATIONALIZATION OF THE LIFEWORLD

Habermas opens his discussion of the rationalization of the lifeworld by stating that rationalization is not a priorily negative term, and lifeworld rationalization simply means a well-functioning, successful lifeworld, as the milieu of communicative action. The perspective, labeled by Habermas as the counter-Enlightenment, has a common conviction about the loss of meaning, anomie, and alienation. The authors of the counter-Enlightenment perspective perceive these as pathologies of bourgeois society and in a way add the rationalization of the lifeworld to the list of pathologies.46 While Habermas disagrees with this counter-Enlightenment perspective, he also makes critical remarks about the current position of the lifeworld that is built around the notion of colonization of the lifeworld.47

The point where it is possible to find the foundation of his disagreement is the following: he assumes that human beings maintain themselves through socially coordinating activities conducted with one another and that this coordination has to be established through communication. This is the Hegelian framework: to perceive the self as an outcome of the interaction with another self, and to see this interaction as possible thanks to the human ability for communication. As the central aim of communication is reaching an agreement, “then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communication.”48 Consequently, rationalization of the lifeworld signifies the development of this rationality, which is (in a way) the substance of communication.

Habermas defines rationalization of the lifeworld as the conditions of rationally motivated mutual understanding, conditions of consensus formation that rest in the end on the authority of the unforced force of the better argument. As long as the lifeworld becomes more rationalized, the number of topics subjected to the force of the better argument will increase; wider discussions will be possible, and more consensus will be reproduced.

through an atmosphere of communicative action. The example given at this point by
Habermas is the idea of the linguistification of the sacred. Accordingly, thanks to
rationalization of the lifeworld, communicative action has the chance of being detached
from concrete and traditional normative behavior patterns. As tradition reproduces fewer
norms, religiously produced consensus comes to be replaced by consensus produced in
language, which is achieved by communicative action. Once the lifeworld is rationalized
up to a certain degree, obedience to law becomes the only normative condition that actors
have to meet.

What would make such a rationalization of the lifeworld possible is a balanced
interaction of different subsystems, namely, cultural, political, and economic. In other
words, when system integration and social integration coexist without the sphere of
one violating that of the other, it may be possible to establish a successful atmosphere of
communication. Habermas sees such peaceful coexistence possible in modern society,
referring to it as the uncoupling of system and lifeworld. With this uncoupling, system
integration definitively breaks free from the horizons of the lifeworld; it escapes from the
insightful knowledge of everyday communicative practice, and for that reason, it
becomes accessible only to a counterintuitive set of knowledge. As system integration
becomes more complex and more dominant, the lifeworld becomes more remote. As
system integration intensifies, the lifeworld appears to shrink into a subsystem, unequal
to system integration.

Together with this uncoupling, Habermas admits that there arise certain problems
resulting from over-rationalization. The best example of these problems is delinguistified
media, such as money and power assuming a greater role in the coordination of actions. Such
media uncouple action coordination from the consensus formation of the communicative
atmosphere. They hold a controlling power. What’s more, “they encode a purposive
rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized,
strategic influence on the decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of
consensus-oriented communication.” Habermas calls this process the technicization of the
lifeworld. The process of technicizing the lifeworld has two basic steps: first, it simplifies
linguistic communication; second, it replaces communicative atmosphere with symbolic
generation of rewards and punishment. As a result, the lifeworld loses its key position in

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the coordination of actions, as well as in the production of social norms and consensus. The more media dismiss the consensus formation raised by the communicative atmosphere, the more complex becomes the network of media-controlled interaction.53

2.2.2 Colonization of the Lifeworld

It should be noted that in his search for an ideal communication atmosphere, Habermas is most critical of the existing communicative mechanism. Hence, he does not restrict his critique to the concept of technicization of the lifeworld, but rather expands it by using a concept developed by Luhmann: colonization of the lifeworld. Habermas states that Luhmann’s systems functionalism is actually based on the assumption that “modern societies that symbolically structured lifeworld have already been driven back into the niches of a systematically self-sufficient and been colonized by it.”54

He develops the concept of the colonization of the lifeworld independent of Luhmann. Accordingly, the over-rationalization, the basic reason for technicization of the lifeworld, also accounts for why the lifeworld has been colonized. Because of the monetarization and bureaucratization of everyday practices both in the private and public spheres, Habermas notices the rise of one-sided life styles and unsatisfied legitimation needs. Again the problem is not about rationalization in itself, but rather it is about the fact that communicative practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian life-style. The economic system reduces and diminishes the private sphere with its reductionist rationality, and, simultaneously, the administrative system does the same thing for public sphere. Meanwhile, all spontaneous process of opinion formation has been subjected to a bureaucratic disempowering and evaporation. Consequently, political decision-making is distanced from masses.55

Returning to his discussion of the lifeworld, Habermas states that the lifeworld involves two interrelated phenomena: 1) it is assimilated to formally organized domains of action, 2) it is cut off from cultural tradition. The first, the one-sided rationalization of daily communication, is caused by the ever-increasing ability of media to control, and the imperative of the media to penetrate the core domain of the lifeworld. The second, the disconnection from tradition, is characterized by the differentiation of science, morality, and art. Such a differentiation means an increasing autonomy of sectors conducted by experts. However, it also means a loss of credibility for tradition. This tradition survives

on the basis of everyday hermeneutics as a kind of second nature, which is no longer powerful.\textsuperscript{56}

2.3 RATIONALIZATION OF POLITICS AND LAW

Habermas does not only deal with the issue of rationalization during the period where he focused on the public sphere and communication. On the contrary, he continues to refer repeatedly to the concept of rationality after his so-called “legal turn,” when he mostly deals with sociology of law and deliberative politics. Habermas’s legal turn appears most clearly in a lecture given in 1986 entitled “Law and Morality.” A close reading of this lecture will be helpful to better understand not only Habermas’s legal turn, but also his discussion and diversification with Weber.

At the beginning of the lecture, Habermas criticizes Weber’s concept of “legal rationality,” which the basis of a positivistic concept of law. For Weber, the domain of law is legally institutionalized procedure, and to attain full rationalization of the law, what is required is a clear separation of law and morality.\textsuperscript{57} This position holds that the sources of legitimation are different for law and morality, and law has its own rationality independent of morality. Moreover, any kind of fusion of law and morality is seen to be a threat to the rationality of law. Habermas notes that Weber perceived morality as a provider of substantive rationality, and this substantive rationality was a threat to the formal rationality of law. In Weber’s thinking, the formalism of law had three components: clear and verifiable norms, a legal system having a uniform structure, and law bounding both the judicial and administrative system. It was the penetration of morality into the domain of law that served to undermine formalism.

Habermas takes issue with Weber’s understanding of the rationality of law on a number of points. For instance, contrary to Weber’s functionalist thesis, he does not believe that legitimizing the law requires making it purely formal. On the contrary, for Habermas, the semantic form of abstract and general law can be justified as rational only in the light of morally substantive principles. In his view, Weber’s error lies not in ignoring the moral core of civil law, but in qualifying all moral insights as subjective value orientations. He accuses Weber of not seeing the possibility of ethical formalism, which is compatible with the formalism required for the rationalization of legal system.

\textsuperscript{56} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action, II}, p.327.

\textsuperscript{57} Jürgen Habermas, “Law and Morality.”
Habermas draws two conclusions in his criticism of Weber: 1) for legal discourse, it is impossible to operate within a closed universe of unambiguously fixed legal rules; and 2) “Legitimacy is possible on the basis of legality insofar as the procedures for the production and application of legal norms are also conducted reasonably, in the moral-practical sense of procedural rationality.”

Having specified the moral-practical sense of procedural rationality as the source of legitimacy of legal domain, he emphasizes the necessity of “deformalization” of law, which is simply redefining its formalism with a morality produced in an intersubjective way. In other words, Habermas believes that Weber’s concept of legal formalism, which has a certain influencing power in Western legal system, should be replaced by proceduralist theory of justice.

Habermas sees three serious contenders for such a procedural theory of justice, and all of them are in a way connected to the Kantian tradition. One is the work of John Rawls, which tries to combine a contractual model with a new definition of original position. According to Rawls, the correct principles are obtainable by the rational egoism of free and equal parties of the contractual process. Another is the procedural theory developed by Lawrence Kohlberg, who acknowledges Mead’s model of universal reciprocity in perspective taking. The idealized original position of the social contract theory is revitalized by stressing ideal role taking. Habermas assesses these models as insufficient because neither of them assigns the burden of generating complete justice to the cognitive claim of moral judgments. The third candidate is Karl-Otto Apel and Habermas himself. Compared to the first two contenders, the third is distinct in that it is not a part of social contract tradition. They only proposed moral argumentation as the adequate procedure of rational will formation. Habermas makes two points in order to clarify how politics, law and morality are situated with respect to each other in his understanding of procedural justice. First, he locates law between politics and morality. This can be explained by the instrumental aspect of law. Habermas classifies moral norms as ends in themselves; this is in contrast to legal norms, which can be set to realize political goals. Hence, the only aim of law is solving conflicts; but it is also a means for the realization of political programs.

Second, Habermas suggests that morality is not suspended above the law, but it is penetrated into the core of positive law, albeit without a complete merging. Thanks to this penetration without complete merging, a procedural law and proceduralized morality can mutually check one another.

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At the very end of the lecture, Habermas makes a crucial point with respect to the legal turn in his thought.

“A legal system does not acquire autonomy on its own. It is autonomous only to the extent that the legal procedures institutionalized for legislation and for the administration of justice guarantee impartial judgment and provide the channels through which practical reason gains entrance into law and politics. There can be no autonomous law without the realization of democracy.”

This point basically illustrates that the way to make law autonomous is not to overestimate formalism, as Weber did, but to establish a well-structured democracy, where the will formation of the parties of communication process can become the legal norm. As a result, the core of Habermas’s legal turn is not only making the law autonomous but having it checked by morality, too. In this way, he arrives at the notion of deliberative democracy, because in his approach, the realization of democracy is not fully possible within republican or liberal models. Now in order to better understand what he means by rationalization of democracy within a legal framework, his understanding of deliberative democracy needs to be examined.

Habermas provides the clearest definition of deliberative politics in his article “Three Normative Models of Democracy;” in its shortest version, deliberative politics is a procedural model of democracy. In terms of answering “what is meant by ‘deliberative politics’?” Habermas quotes F. I. Michelman’s definition:

“Deliberation… refers to a certain attitude toward social cooperation, namely, that openness to persuasion by reasons referring to the claims of others as well as one’s own. The deliberative medium is a good faith exchange of views—including participants’ reports of their own understanding of their respective vital interests—… in which a vote, if any vote is taken, represents a pooling of judgments.”

Habermas clarifies deliberative model by comparing it with liberal and republican models. This comparison gives the essence of his contribution to the theory of democracy.

Accordingly, according to the republican model, democratic will formation is the constituting

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64. The second level of comparison is about popular sovereignty, and as it is not directly related to the issue of rationalization, it will not be covered in this paper.
element of society as a political community, which serves to maintain the memory of this founding power. The liberal model sees the function of democratic will formation as *legitimating* the exercises of political power. The state power is assumed to be legitimate because it is ruled by an elected government. The deliberative model brings a third idea into play: it sees the function of democratic will formation “as the most important sluices for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of a government and an administration bounded by law…”\(^6^5\) In this context, rationalization is understood as something only possible by deliberation. Habermas remarks that the meaning of this kind of rationalization is stronger than a mere legitimation, but weaker than a constitutional framework. Nevertheless, he does not understand deliberative rationalization as a substitute for political system. The deliberation process should build itself as a subsystem without aiming to rule directly. Ruling is not the task of public opinion or communicative power working via democratic procedures; instead, its task is to channel the use of administrative power in specific directions.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DIALECTIC OF RATIONALIZATION**

The overview presented so far on the different uses of the concept of rationalization reminds us that for social theory and the discipline of sociology, the macro level is a *sine qua non*. In the second half of the twentieth century, there were contributions to the discipline with an emphasis on micro-level analysis and many sociologists followed the framework of middle-range theory advocated by Robert Merton. Yet, the comparative analysis of Weber and Habermas on the use of rationalization reveals that without taking large-scale social patterns as objects of study, it would be impossible for sociology to have a holistic analysis of social reality and to have a strong critical sociological imagination. This paper presented an overview on the different uses of rationalization by Weber and Habermas, but one should also note other contributions to the literature employing the concept of rationalization with a macrosociological perspective. Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust* and George Ritzer’s *The McDonaldization of Society* are primary examples of such kind of endeavor.\(^6^6\) In his influential book, Bauman convincingly argues that Holocaust was not a result of an irrational barbarity. Rather, it was the rational

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\(^6^5\) Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” p.250.

bureaucratic order that made it possible. Ritzer maintains that the fast-food system dominated by formal rationality is a good example of the irrationality of rationality, as the system denies the basic human reason of the people who work for the system or are served by them. As one could notice, both Bauman’s and Ritzer’s macrosociological analyses are highly influenced by Weberian macrosociology and his views on the iron cage of bureaucracy.

What is the conclusion of the comparative analysis of Weber’s and Habermas’s uses of the concept of rationalization presented here? Briefly put, one could observe both a divergence and a convergence in Weber and Habermas with respect to their understanding on rationalization. The divergence is about their degree of pessimism. Weber is very pessimistic about the potential end results of rationalization. Whereas, for Habermas, these potential end results exist alongside with the positive value of rationalization, which he thinks is indispensable for progress. Weber and Habermas converge, however, as they both observe two components in the process of rationalization. For both of them, these two components are dichotomous and they constitute the dialectic nature of rationalization.

How does Weber analyze these two dichotomous components of rationalization? In the article “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science,” Weber states that there is a deep struggle in the world about the sacred and the meaning of the world. This is not the only dichotomy that Weber talks about. In “Politics as Vocation,” Max Weber, talks about the tragic nature of politics based on the dichotomy between “ethic of conviction” and “ethics of responsibility.” Moreover, according to Weber, one can observe a dichotomy between democracy and bureaucracy. There is a similar dichotomy between substantive and formal rationality. The set of dichotomies addressed by Weber makes the basic framework of his macrosociology. But the crucial point is that Weber does not perceive them as absolute contrasts but instead uses them to understand the modern world. He states that “ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility” are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements. They are supplements because a pure “ethic of conviction” without acknowledging an understanding of responsibility would damage the ultimate end. Similarly, in order to have an operational democracy, bureaucratic regulations are indispensable; yet expansion of bureaucracy may debase democracy. So again, it is impossible to argue an absolute dichotomy between democracy and bureaucracy. In his article “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,” Weber discusses the

dichotomy between religion and the existing (modern) world order. What he explains is not the religious rejection of the world but rather the tension between religion and the world, a constant struggle (on giving the meaning to the world). It is not possible to say that religion totally rejects the world, because Weber points out that asceticism has a dual character including both the abnegation of the world and a will to master it. Similarly, to comprehend Weber’s concept of rationalization, it is necessary to realize that he does ascribe solely a negative connotation to it. He also emphasizes that rationalization is something positive in several social domains and it corresponds to progress for humanity. But he also offers a set of caveats for the case where rationalization can even be dangerous because of its own rationality. The concept “unanticipated consequences” explains this possibility. In other words, for Weber the process of rationalization has a Janus face. Not only does it bring systematization to society, it may result in the obliteration of the human dimension within systematic concerns.

How does Habermas articulate two components of rationalization? Habermas places a greater emphasis on the positive side of this dialectical nature than does Weber. For Habermas, rationalization is not a priori a negative term. His emphasis on positive rationalization is mostly visible when he talks about rationalization of the lifeworld. This can be also considered as rationalization of the general communication process. Habermas sees the future of the society in a well-functioning, successful lifeworld as the milieu of communicative action. For him, the evolution of society is “toward a rational society,” as his book title implies, and this will be realized through the rationalization of communication. In this context, Habermas underlines the importance of rationally motivated mutual understanding, consensus formation based on the unforced force of the better argument. For Habermas, as lifeworld gets more rationalized, the number of topics subjected to the force of the better argument will increase. But it is also necessary not to forget that Habermas admits the potential risks arising from over-rationalization. The increasing hegemony of money-exchange and power is an example of this risk. By also discussing this risk with his contribution of colonization of lifeworld, Habermas incorporates two sides of the dialectic of rationalization into his macrosociological theory.

One should note that there is not only a dichotomy but also a dialectical relationship between the two components of rationalization, and as the convergence thesis of this comparative analysis implies, both Weber and Habermas acknowledge this dialectical

nature of rationalization. Rationalization as control over an array of uncertainties includes both positive and potentially dangerous aspects. The positive component includes in itself the negative one -the risk of overdoing standardization at an irrational level. This is the case simply because the search for more control does not always start with a negative intention, but positive targets leading towards more control can cause negative end results. The use of formal rationality did certainly bring many achievements for human society. Yet, at the same time, due to the risk which is embedded in rationalization, the growth of formal rationality caused several problems. Moreover, the later stage of dichotomy is based on the synthesis of the positive and negative components of the previous stage, the Hegelian Aufhebung. This comparative analysis reminds us that analyzing this dialectical nature of rationalization is primarily the task of macrosociology, in order to reclaim the critical sociological imagination about modern society.

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