Failed State Concept and the Sub-Saharan African Experience

Cem Karadeli

Abstract

State formation and state failure processes have become major themes in the study of international politics due to the Central Asian-Caucasian and Sub-Saharan African experiences in the last couple of decades. State formation after full independence, or sustaining a weak state have dominated the daily lives of these two regions. Transition from colonial rule or semi-colonial status to full sovereignty as well as a need to be incorporated into the new, globalised, world order caused dramatic changes in these regions. However, even in the transition from colonial rule, former British Asia, former Russian/Soviet Asia, and former French/Belgian Africa show serious differences. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region which has many weak and failed states and the region’s countries experience state failure far more acutely than other similar regions. A different solution is required to sustain these states’ existence and their integration to the new, globalised, international system without burdening them further.

Keywords: Failed state, weak state, Sub-Saharan Africa, democratization.

Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: Başarısız devletler, zayıf devletler, Sahra-altı Afrika, demokratikleşme.

* Çankaya University, Department of Political Science and International Relations.
Failed State Concept and the Sub-Saharan African Experience

INTRODUCTION

State formation and state failure became major themes in the study of international politics due to the Central Asian-Caucasian and Sub-Saharan Africa experiences in the last few decades. State formation after full independence, or sustaining a weak state have dominated the daily lives of these two regions. Transition from colonial rule or semi-colonial status to full sovereignty as well as a need to be incorporated into the new, globalised, world order caused dramatic changes in these regions. Economies mainly based on monoculture; political corruption and inexperience; cultural domination of outside forces led these countries to experiences which are singularly different but conceptually similar.

In this context, we can say that Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia provide two very intriguingly similar examples for analysis. On the one hand, there is the Sub-Saharan African states established after a lengthy colonial rule; for instance Burundi and Rwanda which became independent after Belgian colonial rule of about five decades since the beginning of the twentieth century. On the other hand, there is the Central Asian republics who became independent in the wake of the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after being grouped into titular federated states by the USSR in the second decade of the 20th century. Parallels can be drawn between the two groups of countries for the Soviet handling of the then Soviet Central Asia is, for most instance and purposes, very similar to the colonialist constructs.

Failed States, Enduring States, and Totalitarian States

Basically, a state is considered as a sovereign state if it performs three major basic tasks: a) to have sovereign control over a given territory, b) to mobilise masses for needs of the state, as in collection of taxes or compulsory education, and c) to protect its subjects/citizens from internal and external threats against their lives, properties, and freedoms of thought and expression. However, states cover a very wide spectrum from totalitarian states to failed states in terms of their ability to control their public and the everyday developments in their countries.

A state is successful, that is enduring, if it holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive physical force within its borders. When this monopoly is broken or threatened, the state’s existence is questionable because as the state loses its monopoly on use of coercive force, it begins to fail to lose a) its control based on use or threat of use of force over its subjects or citizens; b) its control over a given territory; and c) – its ability to collect taxes and provide the services expected to be provided by the state since the beginning of the twentieth century such as education, roads, health services and so on. In this case, one can categorise a state as a fragile, if not failed, state. On the complete opposite end of the political spectrum, we can see the failed state. The Crisis States
Research Centre defines a “failed state” as a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. Therefore, a failed state is unable to reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

On the other hand, looking at the general characteristics of the failed and fragile states, it can be argued that the other end of the spectrum is the all-controlling totalitarian state as a failed state has no control over its territory and generally its citizens. Totalitarian rule can be defined as the extreme case in which state controls the lives of its people in nearly all politically significant areas of social, economic, and political life. In 1956 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski had considered communism as the real model for totalitarian rule since Nazism was already defeated. The six factors that made a regime totalitarian according to Friedrich and Brzezinski were belief in an ideology focused on perfect final state of humanity, a single mass party usually symbolised by or subordinated to one leader, an advanced and near-complete monopoly of the coercive forces, a monopoly on the means of mass communication, a centrally-controlled and manipulated economy, and physical or psychological control by use of terror. It is therefore logical to think that totalitarian state is the antithesis of the failed state, however, it is possible to be a failed state and to have a totalitarian regime at the same time. That the regime has near complete control over the state institutions and coercive and ideological apparati does not mean that the ruling regime has a willingness to use these to legitimise itself or to improve the lives of its citizens. Uzbekistan is a clear example of this sort of failed state as can be seen below.

Antonio Gramsci emphasises a very crucial point when he states that the main mistake in politics arises from the misconception of the state as a monolithic organisation ruling with authority and sovereignty, because state does not rule only through the coercive forces; it makes use of ideology to prevent a counterrevolution. Therefore, the administration is not only coercive and/or limiting in terms of individual manoeuvring spaces, but also is hegemonic within the system it rules. To enjoy this hegemonic position more easily, each and every ruling regime uses different methods. Jean Baudrillard, Louis Althusser, and Michel Foucault have worked on these different methods and their application similar on theoretical framework but different in superstructure. According to Louis Althusser, there are two means state can exercise its authority and control over the masses: through the repressive apparati and through the ideological apparati of the state. When we look at the use of these means, perhaps, the major difference between a failed state and a state which functions properly becomes the clearest and most evident: The use of ideological apparati, such as institutions of education or of the mass media, reinforces the legitimacy of the state as well as its capacity to control its subjects/citizens. The problem with a

failed, fragile, or crisis state arises from exactly this distinction, and not its inability to control the coercive means. In short, even a fragile state which is not necessarily a failed state, can fail to convince its subjects in terms of its legitimacy and its reasons for existence. This failure creates grave problems on the legitimacy of the state itself as opposed to questions about the legitimacy of the ruling order and its use of coercive means.

Moreover, the United States emerging as the hegemon of the system and dictating the rest of the world its economic and political principles also makes the matter of state failure a subject deeply rooted in the affairs of the world. In the context of mundane, everyday politics of the 21st century, the definition of Hannes Adomeit that “imperialism as a state of affairs denotes a relationship of a controlling, dominant, hegemonic power over dependent peoples or nations” makes perfect sense of the US insistence on globalization and liberalization of economics and liberalization of politics. Michael Ignatieff claims that that the stand of the US is “imperial” because it is “an attempt to permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national interests” which overlaps with Niall Ferguson’s view that globalization is just US dictating its rules on other nations without resorting to coercive means.

Under these circumstances, the world politics shows a very interesting twist as one state, the hegemon, the United States, defines and dictates the rules of the system and the ones that do not make use of these rules are considered as outcasts, rogue states, and undesirable. North Korea and Iran are examples for such states. On the other hand, there are those states which cannot comply with the rules that dictate the global world order and these are the failed and fragile states.

**DIFFERENT IMPERIALISMS, DIFFERENT COLONISATIONS**

The British rule over the Indian subcontinent created an interesting model of imperialistic expansion. On the one hand, the British imperialism depended on trade relations and therefore creating strong economic ties between the colonies and Great Britain was of prime importance. On the other hand, the British were interested in ruling with the least possible use of coercion in the period before 1870s, therefore they ruled via the native upper classes they transformed into thinking like the British. So, when

---


the British left the region which is today’s India, Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, there were strong institutions which were functioning well with the native bureaucrats in place. English language was the main common element among different groups, and the British culture became very important in the lives of these nations.

On the other hand, the Russian –and later Soviet- colonisation was an inwards colonisation process which was aimed at colonising the periphery of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union. In this sort of colonialism, the culture of the region was altered as the elements of Russian culture, lifestyle, set of values, and administrative structure and bureaucracy were implemented. Central Asian periphery gave all the signs of a Huntingtonian “fault line conflict” with the Soviet/Russian core in cultural, social, and religious terms. A fault line conflict is defined to take place between different nations, ethnic groups, or clans who neighbour each other but which belong to different cultures⁴. In case of Central Asia, it is a conflict between the Orthodox Russian culture and weltanschauung and the mostly Muslim Turkic culture of the region.

In addition to the domestic problems, The Caucasian – Central Asian geography is also the scene of a so-called core state conflict. The region is the actual field in a clash between Americans, Russians and the Chinese; each aiming to create its sphere of influence in the region. The US view concerning Central Asia is that the countries of the region should Westernise and accept the political and economic ideals pursued by the West. This last is a direct controversy with the past of these countries which were affected by the Imperial Russian and Soviet rule which incorporated Russian nationalistic behaviour towards the native populations. This situation directly leads a cultural fault line in these countries among Western, Slavonic and native Turkic values. From a different perspective, these countries go through a change of system, and based on their relation with Moscow constitute the image of postcolonial weak states. Francis Ford Fukuyama claims that the collapse of the Soviet Union brought along the same effects as the decolonisation process after World War II. He argues that there was a state-building process going on in the wake of the fall of the Soviet system and it varied in degrees from state to state as in previous periods of decolonisation⁵.

Also as the ruling cadres come from a background of patronage/clientele relations they tend to have a Jacobinist approach to the roles of the state and the bureaucracy. Therefore, even if it can be claimed that state behaviour ‘has become increasingly circumscribed by burgeoning regional and international regulatory frameworks, regimes and institutions, growing interdependence, and the development of information and

---


communication technologies\(^6\), these states tend to be ruled by a clique according to the idea of how a state should be and how it should function.

Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes a clearly different pattern of colonisation than these two even though some major elements of the colonial structure of Africa overlap with the British and the Russian styles of colonisation.

**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

When one looks at the situation in Central to Southern [sub-Saharan] Africa and in Central Asia, one can see that the major problems in state-formation, state legitimacy, and state failure are closely connected to the intra-cultural differences and to post-colonial structures. Sub-Saharan Africa is manifestly experiencing the tremors of the post-colonial state-formation. This case is very evident in such countries like Burundi and Rwanda. In Burundi and Rwanda, the Belgian colonial rule clearly distinguished between the two tribes of the Hutus and the Tutsis; the latter being closer to Caucasian features was considered as the superior race and the former was deemed as the inferior race during the colonial rule. This led to the formation of a Tutsi-minority rule through continual military regimes in Burundi which only saw rearrangement of power relations to give more rights to the Hutu majority as late as 1994 and 2003. In other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the French created their own colonial rule and their own impact on the post-colonial lives of their former colonies.

The African situation is clearly different from the different cases in Asia because the way Africa was colonised differs greatly from the British and Russian/Soviet colonisation processes. When the Belgians and the French left Sub-Saharan Africa, from Chad to Congo to Burundi, this region had no local notables working in cooperation with the imperialistic centres; there were no education and indoctrination of the masses to facilitate Belgian / French rule, and there was no regional bourgeoisie, either. Thus, the general feeling of decentralisation and the chaos that pursued independence was far deeper and far more harming than in Central and Subcontinental Asia. The inability of the Sub-Saharan states to establish at least a seemingly totalitarian rule or their inability to provide education and health services to their citizens are major proofs of this major lack of social readiness. The following cases show that failed states of Africa troubles are far deeper and more dangerous than those faced by the failed states of Asia.

**Burundi**

Burundi, for instance, is a very clear example of state failure in its inability to use means of coercion or the threat to employ them in order to protect order in the country.

---

Burundi’s first democratically elected president was assassinated in October 1993 after only one hundred days in office. This assassination led to a civil war which cost the lives of more than 200,000 Burundians while far more than that number became internally displaced or became refugees in neighbouring countries.

As the Burundian state was unable to cope with the situation, an internationally brokered power-sharing agreement between the Tutsi-dominated government and the Hutu rebels in 2003 had to be arranged. This agreement led to a transition process which resulted in the establishment of an integrated defence force, to the preparation of a new constitution in 2005, and elected a majority Hutu government in 2005. The new government, led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, signed a ceasefire agreement with the country’s last rebel group in September of 2006 with the Republic of South Africa acting as intermediary between the government and the rebels. However, there are still many challenges facing Burundi at the moment.

When we look at Burundian economy, it is clearly dependent on the production and export of coffee and tea which make up 90% of the country’s exports. The Tutsi minority which constitutes 14% of the population dominates the coffee trade as well as the government at the expense of the Hutu majority which makes up 85% of the population. The civil war which went on for over a decade wounded up with over 200,000 deaths, over 48,000 refugees into Tanzania, and created 140,000 internally displaced people within the country. When this socio-political panorama is combined with the facts that half the children cannot attend school, approximately 8% of the country’s adult population has HIV / AIDS, and that about 68% of Burundians live below the poverty line, any possibility of development from the country’s current state seems far-fetched.

However, there are developments that give hope for the future. For instance, the political consensus reached at the end of the civil war convinced the international institutions that Burundi is viable for economic aid, and therefore there is a series of foreign aid programs that target the country in the last few years. It is still prudent to note that the country which has a very low per capita GDP at $700 calculated in the context of Purchasing Power Parity, depends heavily on the international market fluctuations on tea and coffee prices and international aid to carry on with its 2006 growth rate of 5%.

Even more important than the economic situation however, is the general political situation which is based on a fragile balance on the conflicts among the Tutsi, the Hutu, and various other less-significant ethnic groups. The United Nations Operation in Burundi which helped stabilise the situation completed its mandate at the end of 2006 after a 3-year long peace-keeping mission and is now away. This leaves the new government of Burundi to deal with political insurgents, armed gangs and local warlords.

---

8 Ibid.
which threaten the exercise of sovereignty via the armed forces in the troubled Great Lakes region. If Burundi has a faint hope of recovery, it has to guarantee the lives, freedom, and property of its citizens and the first step in that can be the continuation of the current political system based on a Tutsi-Hutu compromise in the formation of the national assembly. From this compromise, which also foresaw a 1/3 female quota in the parliament, a Burundian democratic system may emerge to last. Then, the issues of maintaining state authority and the rule of law, as well as economic development may be dealt more easily. Burundi, unlike its regional neighbours, has a chance to solve its problem with state failure.

Rwanda

Rwanda is a country with three ethnic groups: the Hutu who make up 84%, the Tutsi who make up 15%, and the Twa who make up 1% of the population while the population adopts Roman Catholicism (56.5%), Protestantism (26%), Adventism (11.1%), and Islam (4.6%).

The country, just like Burundi, was a Belgian colony and gained its independence in 1962. However, before independence, in 1959, the Hutu, the majority ethnic group, overthrew the Tutsi king who ruled on Belgium’s behalf. The main idea of the Hutu being the ruled and the Tutsi the ruling groups in contrast with their percentage in the country’s population is that the Belgians thought the Tutsi who were lighter in colour and therefore closer to the Caucasian race, hence more “civilised”, more “suitable” to rule.9

The 1959 coup led to several years of domestic conflicts during which thousands of Tutsi were killed and over 150,000 had to live in exile in neighbouring countries. In 1990, a civil war started when the second generation of these exiles formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and engaged Rwandan government forces. The civil war climaxed with the genocide of over 800,000 Tutsis as well as of moderate Hutus in April 1994. After three months of intense fighting, the Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime and ended the killing in July 1994, but about two million Hutus fled to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo in fear of retribution from the Tutsis.

The 1994 genocide obviously creates a turning point in the history of Rwanda. Even as many refugees returned to Rwanda, the Rwandan state cannot be claimed to convincingly rule over its citizens. Some Hutu refugees formed an extremist insurgency in order to regain the control of the country just like Rwandan Patriotic Front did back in 1990. Rwanda held its first post-genocide local elections in March 1999 and its first presidential and parliamentary elections after the genocide in August and September 2003. The current President Paul Kagame, the leader of the RPF, allegedly won 95.05% of the vote in August 2003, defeating his two rivals for presidency.

Despite substantial international assistance and political reforms - including Rwanda’s first Rwanda is still struggling to find resources for investment and to increase its agricultural output on the one hand, and to reach ethnic reconciliation on the other hand. The Hutu majority’s perception of the political dominance of the Tutsi at the moment obviously links the state of affairs to the colonial past and hence there are very serious possible outcomes that may arise from this sort of perception. The increasingly centralist and intolerant attitude of the Rwandan government is also complicating the matter. Rwanda’s involvement in two wars in recent years in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo also created question marks towards the ruling regime’s real intentions. The government’s campaign against divisionism and genocidal ideology are used to suppress any opposition movement, therefore working as means to hamper democratic opposition and fuse ethnicity-based civil unrest because it accuses all opponents and dissidents as promoting ethnic identification or promoting the ideology of genocide. Moreover, the government’s Demobilization and Reintegration Commission forced the combatants returning from fighting in the squirmishes in the Democratic Republic of Congo to take a two-month long reeducation programme, then when they were to return to their village, granted them some pocket money. This re-education and indoctrination programme obviously was aimed at strengthening their allegiance to the ruling regime. The government’s crackdown programme on corruption increased the perception of state legitimacy. The forced 30 member-quota for female members in the legislature also improved Rwandan regime’s perception as legitimate, however, there are still major issues to be addressed before any real improvement in public perception might increase.

In fact, all these policies adopted by the ruling regime in Rwanda, when combined with reports of unlawful killings and excessive use of force by security forces, and the restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and practice of religious beliefs, can be seen as just attempts to create an authoritarian/totalitarian control over the citizens of the country. The regime’s choice of adopting ideological apparati in addition to the repressive apparati is quite remarkable for it reminds of the post-Soviet leadership cadres in Central Asia than the leadership cadres in Sub-Saharan Africa who rarely adopted and used such a combination. The style adopted by President Paul Kagame and the Kigali government shows a far stronger will to create a regime which would enable to regime to last long and have a legitimate basis. Therefore, Rwanda, despite its grave social problems stemming from the 1994 genocide may have a more stable future in comparison with Chad or Burundi in which the leadership cadres appear not to have any thought about the prolonged existence and durability of their regimes. These facts

11 Ibid.
may also account for why Rwanda, with its serious ethnic conflict, fares far better than its neighbouring countries in the Fund For Peace Failed State Index: the Fund for Peace ranks leadership, military, police force, the civil service and the judiciary as moderate rather than weak or poor\textsuperscript{12}.

The problem, however, is that the government control is not as strong as required to establish such a regime, and therefore instead of strengthening the country’s sovereignty and the regime’s control over its citizens, it in fact weakens the citizenry’s identification with the Rwandan state, and hence harms the political and social development in the country. Under these circumstances, it is very unlikely to think about an enduring peace and racial reconciliation in the country. The control the government exerts within its borders is also certain to be limited for the majority of the Rwandan population is suspicious of the motives of the ruling regime.

In terms of economics, Rwanda is a poor rural country with about 90\% of the population working in mainly subsistence-aimed agriculture. It is the most densely populated country in Africa despite having a population of 8.6 million. The Rwandan per capita GDP is US$1,300 and the economy is dependant on the country’s few natural resources and its minimal industry. Just like Burundi, the country’s primary exports are coffee and tea and the country is similarly dependant on world market fluctuations on these two items\textsuperscript{13}. The 1994 genocide overshadows the Rwandan economy in more than one areas. Firstly, the civil war, the genocide, and the migration that followed it severely impoverished the population and ground down Rwanda’s eligibility for foreign investment. Even though in the 13 years since the genocide, the country recovered its economic volume to pre-1994 levels, the gap between the poor and the rich is now higher. Rwanda obtained \textit{IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country} initiative debt relief in 2005-2006. Even though these can be seen as improvements, the heavy investment by the Kigali government led to tensions between the country’s government and international donors and lending agencies. Many problems in the domestic and immediate international neighbourhood of the country such as instability, civil atrocities, and lack of adequate means of transportation hamper Rwanda’s economic development in addition to the monoculture agricultural economy.

There are still over 57,000 Rwandan refugees residing in 21 different African states, including Zambia, Gabon, and 20,000 who fled to Burundi in 2005 and 2006 to escape drought and recriminations from traditional courts investigating the 1994 massacres. The country also hosts 41,400 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 4,400 refugees from Burundi.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

In the light of these facts, Rwanda can be said to have a possibility of recovering in the long term due to its president’s policies of creating a strong state. However, the issue of widespread poverty and scarce resources and export commodities, the ethnic tension between the two main tribes, the lack of freedoms of thought and expression, and the fact that the problems leading to the genocide were not solved at all, create question marks over the future of Rwanda. However, if the government proves that it is capable of tolerance for opposition, and manages to limit poverty and create a perception that it is not a Tutsi administration but a provider for all ethnic and religious communities in the country, then perhaps, Rwanda may no more be a failed state in the remote future. Yet, with present conditions withstanding, it is a very hard and unlikely task to fulfil and a very remote target to reach.

**Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire)**

The Democratic Republic of Congo was another Belgian colony which gained independence in 1960. In 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power and not only changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko (literally, “all-powerful warrior”) but the name of his country to Zaire, too. Mobutu stayed in office through coercion and rigged elections until 1997. The Mobutu regime was overthrown in May 1997 because of the civil war which was also affected by the situation in neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda. Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu with a coup d’état and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo, however his position is challenged by an insurrection supported by Uganda and Rwanda in August 1998. Troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe intervened to support the Kabila regime. A cease-fire agreement was concluded in July 1999 by the DRC government, Congolese armed rebel groups, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe however fighting carried on. In January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, replaced him.

In December 2002, the Pretoria Accord was signed by all remaining warring parties to end the fighting and establish a government of national unity. In July 2003, a transitional government was established. This government still led by Joseph Kabila, held a constitutional referendum in December 2005 and elections for the presidency, National Assembly, and provincial legislatures in 2006. Joseph Kabila was inaugurated president in December 2006, three months after the establishment of the National Assembly. The composition of the National Assembly is interesting because of the 500 seats, the six major political parties have 277 seats while the independent candidates received 63 seats and sixty-three smaller political parties have 160 seats. The Senate has eight political parties which have 76 of the 120 available seats, while independents have 26 senatorial seats and 18 other parties have a senator each.\(^{14}\)

In 2006, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) maintained over 18,000 peacekeepers in the region, first deployed in 1999. As this piece of information reflects, DRC is unable to keep its borders and its citizens safe on its own. The country is a refuge haven for over 200,000 refugees from Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Republic of Congo while members of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army forces are settled in Congolese Garamba National Park, proving that the Democratic Republic of Congo is unable to keep border security. In addition to refugees from abroad, there are over 1,100,000 internally displaced people especially in the eastern provinces of the country. The country is also one of Africa’s biggest producers of cannabis, but the production is generally for domestic consumption, hence proving the inability of policing the country by the government.

In terms of economic activity, the Democratic Republic of the Congo which has a per capita GDP of US$700 is on the way to recovery. The coups of 1998 led to a reduction in national output and government revenue, as well as increasing external debt, and causing the deaths of perhaps 3.5 million people from violence, famine, and disease. Foreign businesses fled the country during the conflict. The transitional government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President Kabila is implementing reforms. The country which mainly depends on mining as its source of income appears to be recovering after the foreign invasion troops began to leave the country in late 200215.

When all the relevant data is analysed, it can be claimed that the Democratic Republic of Congo is a failed state and may remain thus in the medium-to-long run. Firstly, the country is unable to exercise sovereign control over its borders as its inability to control the flow of civil and armed refugees into and out of the country. Even the UN MONUC force is unable to provide any semblance to security in the country. Secondly, it cannot provide the basic services of protection of lives, rights, and property of its citizens. It cannot curb the production and consumption of cannabis. The transnational government is composed of the defenders of too many political fractions; the national assembly and the senate both reflect a much fractured social and political structure. Moreover, Joseph Kabila, who is the successor to his father and practically a second-generation dictator, is the only candidate this diversified political front was able to agree upon, and therefore there is really no political depth and no real opposition amongst those 69 political parties represented in the legislature. Even unable to provide coercive apparati of the state, the ruling regime’s future is also in question for there are no candidates to replace Joseph Kabila in the future. Thus, Democratic Republic of Congo appears to be a failed state which is likely to remain a failed state in the long run, too.

15 Ibid.
The Central African Republic

The Central African Republic was born from what was the French colony Ubangi-Shari in 1960. The country was able to have its first civil government in 1993 and until then several military governments ruled the country. However, in March 2003, a coup d’état led by General François Bozize ended the civilian rule. Bozize established a transitional government and won the presidential elections in 2005 with the support of the civil society. The government still has no full control in the countryside, and this makes the working of the government even harder.

One major problem for this country of about 4.4 million inhabitants is the health hazards: There is a very serious AIDS outbreak in the country and due to this epidemic, life expectancy is very low, death rate is very high, and the children are not safe from this disease.

Central African Republic’s economy is based typically on subsistence agriculture, the export of timber, and the diamond industry which earns 40% of the country’s foreign trade volume. However, the country cannot improve its economic situation and improve on its per capita GDP of US$1,200 because of the extraordinarily unequal income distribution, lack of transportation means, and the inability of the government to control all its land. The workforce is mainly unskilled, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic has grave effects on the economy as well as health. Grants from the international community, especially from France can meet only a fraction of the country’s humanitarian needs.

The presence of over 20,000 refugees from Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the 150,000 internally displaced people make Central African Republic’s abilities to control its territory even harder. As the country is in turmoil for the last four and a half decades, the Central African Republic has also become a source and destination country for children trafficked for domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, and forced labour in shops and commercial labour activities.\(^{16}\)

The Central African Republic is a failed state from many dimensions. To begin with, it has no political stability and the state cannot exercise its sovereignty fully over its borders. Secondly, the ruling regime again cannot provide basic health services, and cannot cope with the AIDS epidemic. There are various political parties represented in the national assembly but none can find a solution to the problems the country faces. Thirdly, the refugees from neighbouring countries create problems on their own. Then, the country also has a very unequal income distribution which is, in itself, a gargantuan problem for any well-functioning government anywhere. Finally, the country is unable and/or unwilling to control the child trafficking and is now is monitored by related agencies on that matter. Therefore, the situation in the Central African Republic is dire

---

and needs international assistance to even carry on in the manner things presently are. Failure of UN-led assistance to the country in solving its colossal problems may as well result in the complete collapse of the Central African Republic.

**Conclusion: Fault Lines, Conflict, and State-Building**

What the late European colonisation processes of the 19th and 20th centuries have not left behind was a strong native bourgeoisie or a better educated, sophisticated layer of society which was and able to rule the country without grave problems when the colonisers left. When the Spanish left Latin America in the 19th century, they left behind a strong military and the officers of the newly independent countries ruled their countries and created social, political, and economic hierarchies that would create a strong bourgeois class in the long term. That was the major contribution of the Spanish to the lands they exploited. The British were similar in that they created indigenous upper, ruling classes when they left and that is detectable in India or Pakistan.

However, the Russian/Soviet and Belgian, French cases in Asia and Africa, in their 19th and 20th century kinds of imperialism, there were serious problems because neither the Russians nor the Belgians left behind a base to work with people who could rule the country for them. Russians incorporated a group of indigenous people into their imperial/Soviet bureaucratic machinery; however, the rulers of the newly-independent states are now nearly completely out of touch with the customs, traditions, cultural heritage of their nations. Moreover, in the case of the Belgians, there were procedures which actually led to greater polarisation in these invaded lands, such as the racial discrimination they used while ruling today’s Burundi and Rwanda. As a result of these, when we look at the case of Uzbekistan, just like in Turkmenistan, we see an authoritarian state bordering on totalitarian, and in Africa, we have such chaos in term of implementing even the most basic of policies which show a degree of state legitimacy and sovereignty such as protection against epidemics or ability to provide education to their citizens in such countries as Chad, Central African Republic, or Rwanda. In the former British colonies of Asia, the problems generally occur not because of institutional problems or inability of the rulers, but mainly because of the geographical and geopolitical conditions and in the case of Afghanistan, because of outside influences on the fate of the country.

Therefore, it can be claimed that these failed and/or extremely fragile states were all influenced by their colonial rulers because the invaders implanted their own cultural perspectives and their own principles of social stratification and methods of maintaining order in these lands. It can be said that the fate of these countries perhaps with the exception of Afghanistan, were decided by the socio-political legacies of the powers that invaded an exploited them and not because of any meaningful internal developments. However, even as the responsibility falls upon those who have long left these lands, the burden of solving the variety of grave problems each of these countries face is on their
current administrations. It is evident that the leadership cadres in these countries are unable or –even worse- unwilling to cope with these nearly insurmountable crises.

A different solution is required to sustain these states’ existence and their integration to the new, globalised, international system without burdening them further. As globalisation is a major reality of our day, the help of international society, possibly and preferably under the leadership of United Nations and the creation of new aid and relief networks is the only viable way ahead. An alternative global civil society initiative through the INGOs and/or adoption of rapidly evolving but not too demanding democratisation programmes from non-European Union countries such as Turkey, Brazil, or South Korea may provide the right solution for these countries. The international community should really act on the situation of failed states because leaving these countries to suffer their fate would not only harm these countries themselves but also humanity in general. If the necessary steps are taken to [re]integrate these failed states into the global processes of all kinds, then there is, despite weak, hope for these countries to become more stable and more capable of contributing to their citizens and to the international community.

WORKS CITED: